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Abstract: We study networks of human decision-makers who independently decide how
to protect themselves against Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) epidemics. Motivated by
studies in behavioral economics showing that humans perceive probabilities in a nonlinear
fashion, we examine the impacts of such misperceptions on the equilibrium protection strategies.
In our setting, nodes choose their curing rates to minimize the infection probability under the
degree-based mean-field approximation of the SIS epidemic plus the cost of their selected curing
rate. We establish the existence of a degree based equilibrium under both true and nonlinear
perceptions of infection probabilities (under suitable assumptions). When the per-unit cost of
curing rate is sufficiently high, we show that true expectation minimizers choose the curing rate
to be zero at the equilibrium, while curing rate is nonzero under nonlinear probability weighting.
Keywords: Game Theory, Network Games, SIS Epidemics, Behavioral Economics, Prospect
Theory, Nonlinear Probability Weighting
1. INTRODUCTION
Factors that influence the security, robustness and re-
silience of networked socio-cyber-physical systems include
the characteristics of threats and attacks (Pastor-Satorras
et al., 2015; La, 2016), topology of the network (Hota and
Sundaram, 2018b; Drakopoulos et al., 2016), and central-
ized vs. decentralized decision-making (Manshaei et al.,
2013). In addition, decisions made by humans that interact
and use these systems also have a significant impact on
their security and resilience (Hota, 2017; Sanjab et al.,
2017). In this paper, we investigate the impacts of human
decision-making in the context of Susceptible-Infected-
Susceptible (SIS) epidemics.
SIS epidemics capture a wide range of dynamics in cyber-
physical and social networks, such as spread of diseases in
human society (Hethcote, 2000), and viruses in computer
networks (Sellke et al., 2008). There is a large litera-
ture on mean-field approximations, characterizations of
steady-state behavior, and centralized protection strate-
gies to control SIS epidemics (Preciado et al., 2014; Pastor-
Satorras and Vespignani, 2001; Van Mieghem et al., 2009;
Khanafer et al., 2016); see (Nowzari et al., 2016; Pastor-
Satorras et al., 2015) for recent reviews.
While centralized protection strategies may not be prac-
tical for large-scale networked systems, decentralized and
game-theoretic protection strategies against network epi-
⋆ This research was supported in part by the National Science Foun-
dation, under grant CNS-1718637. This is an extended version of a
paper that appears in the proceedings of the 2nd IFAC Conference
on Cyber-Physical & Human Systems, 2018.
demics have been relatively less explored (Nowzari et al.,
2016; Pastor-Satorras et al., 2015). A common assumption
in the existing literature is that the decision-makers are
risk neutral (i.e., expected cost minimizers), and perceive
infection probabilities as their true values. However, there
is a large body of work in psychology and behavioral eco-
nomics that has shown that humans perceive probabilities
differently from their true values (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979; Dhami, 2016; Barberis, 2013) (see Section 2.1 for
further details), and these behavioral aspects of decision-
making often have a significant impact on the security
of networked systems (Hota and Sundaram, 2018b; Hota
et al., 2016). In the context of epidemics, there is a related
body of research that investigates certain human aspects
of decision-making, particularly imitation behavior (Mbah
et al., 2012), and empathy (Eksin et al., 2017) in an (evo-
lutionary) game-theoretic framework. On the other hand,
the impacts of human (mis)-perception of probabilities is
little explored in the existing work.
Our goal, in this paper, is to characterize the impacts of
human perception of infection probabilities (captured by
prospect-theoretic probability weighting functions (Kah-
neman and Tversky, 1979)) on their protection strategies
against SIS epidemics on networks, and compare it with
the equilibria without probability weighting. Under SIS
epidemics, each node in the network can be in one of the
two states, i) susceptible, and ii) infected. An infected node
is cured with a curing rate δ ≥ 0, while a susceptible node
becomes infected following a Poisson process with rate ν
per infected neighbor. We consider a protection strategy
where nodes choose their curing rates strategically. 1 Since
we consider a cost minimization problem for the decision-
makers, we refer to players who perceive probabilities as
their true values as true expectation minimizers.
Prior work (Omic et al., 2009; Trajanovski et al., 2015)
on epidemic games has relied on the N-Intertwined Mean
Field Approximation (NIMFA) (Van Mieghem et al., 2009;
Van Mieghem and Omic, 2013). (Omic et al., 2009) studied
a game-theoretic setting where nodes choose their curing
rates, and showed the existence of a pure Nash equi-
librium (PNE) assuming that the steady-state infection
probability of a node is a convex function of her own
curing rate under the NIMFA. However, the follow up work
(Van Mieghem and Omic, 2013) observed that the above
convexity assumption does not hold in general. Further-
more, under the NIMFA, the nodes need to be aware of
the structure of the entire network.
In order to analyze the game-theoretic setting in gen-
eral networks and under prospect-theoretic perception
of probabilities, we consider the degree-based mean-field
(DBMF) approximation (Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani,
2001; Pastor-Satorras et al., 2015) (summarized in Sec-
tion 2.2) to capture the infection probabilities. Under the
DBMF approximation, each node is only aware of its own
degree and the degree distribution of the network. While
the DBMF approximation is coarser than the NIMFA, it is
more tractable to analyze. In particular, we show that the
(perceived) infection probability of a node is convex in her
curing rate under the DBMF approximation under suitable
assumptions. We then prove the existence of a degree
based equilibrium (DBE) (formally defined in Section 3)
for both true expectation minimizers and under nonlinear
probability weighting, and derive various characteristics
of the DBE. For instance, when the per-unit cost of cur-
ing rate is high, true expectation minimizers choose the
curing rate to be 0 at the DBE, while under nonlinear
perception of probabilities, the equilibrium curing rate is
always nonzero for any finite per-unit cost of curing rate.
We further illustrate how the optimal curing rate varies
as a function of the cost parameter and the nonlinear
probability weighting function in degree-regular graphs.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Nonlinear probability weighting
Decades of research in behavioral economics has shown
that humans perceive probabilities associated with un-
certain outcomes in a nonlinear fashion (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979; Gonzalez and Wu, 1999; Dhami, 2016).
Specifically, humans overweight probabilities that are close
to 0 (referred to as possibility effect), and underweight
probabilities that are close to 1 (referred to as certainty
effect). In the Prospect theory framework of (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979), the authors captured the transfor-
mation of true probabilities into perceived probabilities
by an inverse S-shaped probability weighting function
w : [0, 1] → [0, 1] (i.e., a true probability x is perceived
as w(x)). Several parametric forms of weighting functions
have been proposed in (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992;
1 In Hota and Sundaram (2018a), we considered the setting where
nodes choose whether or not to vaccinate against SIS epidemics.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
x
w
(x)
 
 
α=1
α=0.8
α=0.4
Fig. 1. Shape of the probability weighting function (1).
The quantity x is the true probability, and w(x) is
the corresponding perceived probability.
Prelec, 1998; Gonzalez and Wu, 1999). These weighting
functions have the same general shape, and satisfy the
following properties (Hota and Sundaram, 2018a).
Assumption 1. The probability weighting function w sat-
isfies the following properties.
1. w is strictly increasing, with w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1.
2. w′(x) has a unique minimum denoted by xmin,w :=
argminx∈[0,1]w
′(x). Furthermore, w′(xmin,w) < 1 and
w′′(xmin,w) = 0.
3. w(x) is strictly concave for x ∈ [0, xmin,w), and is
strictly convex for x ∈ (xmin,w, 1].
4. w′(ǫ)→∞ as ǫ→ 0, and w′(1− ǫ)→∞ as ǫ→ 0.
The above assumptions imply that there exists a unique
x0,w ∈ [0, 1] such that w(x) > x for x ∈ [0, x0,w), and
w(x) < x for x ∈ (x0,w , 1].
Our theoretical results hold for probability weighting func-
tions that satisfy Assumption 1. For instance, the weight-
ing function proposed by (Prelec, 1998) is given by
w(x) = exp(−(− ln(x))α), x ∈ [0, 1], (1)
where α ∈ (0, 1), and exp(·) is the exponential function.
For α = 1, we have w(x) = x, i.e., the perceived and
true probabilities coincide. For smaller α, the function
w(x) has a sharper overweighting of low probabilities and
underweighting of high probabilities. Figure 1 shows the
shape of the Prelec weighting function for different values
of α. Prelec weighting functions with α ∈ (0, 1) satisfy
Assumption 1, and have xmin,w = x0,w =
1
e
, w(1
e
) = 1
e
for
every α ∈ (0, 1), and w′(1
e
) = α.
2.2 Degree based mean-field approximation of the SIS
epidemic
Consider an undirected network with D being the set of
degrees of the nodes, and degree distribution P (·), i.e., the
probability that a randomly chosen node has degree k is
P (k). Let 1 < dˆ < ∞ and d¯ < ∞ be the average and
highest degrees of the nodes in the network, respectively.
Unless specified otherwise, we assume that the minimum
degree of any node in the network is 1. Furthermore, let
the network be uncorrelated, i.e., the probability that an
edge originating from a node with degree k is connected to
a node with degree k′ is independent of k. For uncorrelated
networks, the probability that a randomly chosen neighbor
(of any node) has degree i is approximately qi :=
iP (i)
〈d〉
(Pastor-Satorras et al., 2015), where 〈d〉 = dˆ− 1.
As discussed earlier, each node in the network can be in one
of two states: i) susceptible, or ii) infected. Without loss
of generality, let the infection rate to be ν = 1. Under the
DBMF approximation (Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani,
2001; Pastor-Satorras et al., 2015), every node with a
given degree k is treated as statistically equivalent. Let
δk ≥ 0 be the curing rate of every node with degree k. Let
δ = {δ}k∈D be the vector of curing rates. The infection
probability of a degree k node, x˜k(t, δ), evolves as
∂x˜k(t, δ)
∂t
= −δkx˜k(t, δ) + (1− x˜k(t))k
∑
i∈D
qix˜i(t, δ), (2)
under the DBMF approximation. The DBMF approxima-
tion is better if the timescale at which nodes interact with
each other in the random graph model is faster than the
timescale at which the epidemic spreads (Pastor-Satorras
et al., 2015). At the stationary-state of the above dynam-
ics, the infection probability of a degree k node is
xk(δ)=
kv
δk + kv
, v(δ)=
d¯∑
i=1
xi(δ)qi=
d¯∑
i=1
iv(δ)qi
δi + iv(δ)
. (3)
The quantity v(δ) represents the steady-state probability
that a randomly chosen neighbor is infected, and satisfies
v(δ)

1−
d¯∑
i=1
iqi
δi + iv(δ)

 = 0. (4)
Note that v(δ) = 0 always satisfies the above equation,
which corresponds to the disease-free state. Furthermore,
depending on δ, there may exist a nonzero v ∈ (0, 1] that
satisfies (4). A nonzero solution of v(δ) is referred to as
the “endemic” state where the epidemic persists in the
network for a long time. We state the following result on
the uniqueness and stability of the endemic state.
Theorem 1. Let R :=
∑
i∈D
iqi
δi
.
(1) x∗i = 0, ∀i ∈ D is the unique stationary-state of the
dynamics in (2) if and only if R ≤ 1. This disease free
state is globally asymptotically stable.
(2) If R > 1, x∗i = 0, ∀i ∈ D is an unstable stationary-
state. Furthermore, there exists a stationary state,
referred to as an endemic state, where x∗i > 0, ∀i ∈ D
if and only if R > 1. This nonzero endemic state
is unique, is locally exponentially stable, and the
dynamics converge to this endemic state from any
initial condition except the disease free state.
The proof exploits the relationship between the NIMFA
and DBMF approximations, and leverages similar results
obtained for the NIMFA (Khanafer et al., 2016; Bullo,
2016). We omit this for space constraints as it is analogous
to the proof of (Hota and Sundaram, 2018a, Theorem 1).
Following conventional notation, we denote the vector of
curing rates by all nodes other than the nodes with degree
k as δ−k. We start with a corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. Let δˆk(δ−k) := kqk
[
1−
∑d¯
i=1
i6=k
iqi
δi
]−1
. A
unique nonzero solution of v(δk, δ−k) to (4) exists if and
only if δk ∈ [0, δˆk(δ−k)).
Proof. Note that δk < δˆk(δ−k) is equivalent to
δk
kqk
<

1−
d¯∑
i=1
i6=k
iqi
δi


−1
⇐⇒
kqk
δk
+
d¯∑
i=1
i6=k
iqi
δi
> 1,
or R > 1. Following Theorem 1, there exists a unique
endemic state corresponding to a unique nonzero v(δ). 
We now show monotonicity and convexity of v(δ) in the
endemic state. We denote ∂v
∂δk
by v′k and
∂2v
∂δ2
k
by v′′k .
Lemma 1. v(δk, δ−k) is decreasing and convex in δk for
δk ∈ [0, δˆk(δ−k)).
Proof. We drop the argument (δk, δ−k) from the proof for
better readability. From (4), we know that a nonzero v(δ)
must satisfy
1 =
d¯∑
i=1
iqi
δi + iv(δ)
(5)
=⇒ 0 =
d¯∑
i=1
i6=k
[
−
i2v′kqi
(δi + iv)2
]
−
k(1 + kv′k)qk
(δk + kv)2
=⇒
k(1 + kv′k)qk
(δk + kv)2
= −
d¯∑
i=1
i6=k
i2v′kqi
(δi + iv)2
(6)
=⇒ − v′k =
kqk
(δk + kv)2

 d¯∑
i=1
i2qi
(δi + iv)2


−1
> 0. (7)
We then differentiate (6) with respect to δk, and obtain
k2qkv
′′
k
(δk + kv)2
−
2kqk(1 + kv
′
k)
2
(δk + kv)3
=
d¯∑
i=1
i6=k
[
−
i2qiv
′′
k
(δi + iv)2
+
2i3qi(v
′
k)
2
(δi + iv)3
]
=⇒ v′′k
d¯∑
i=1
i2qi
(δi + iv)2
=
2kqk(1 + kv
′
k)
2
(δk + kv)3
+
d¯∑
i=1
i6=k
2i3qi(v
′
k)
2
(δi + iv)3
,
following straightforward calculations.Thus, v′′k > 0. 
Remark 1. In the rest of this paper, we define v(δ) as the
nonzero solution that satisfies (4) if 1 <
∑d¯
i=1
iqi
δi
, and
v(δ) = 0 otherwise. In other words, v(δ) := max(0, vˆ(δ)),
where z = vˆ(δ) ∈ R is the unique root of 1−
∑d¯
i=1
iqi
δi+iz
=
0. Accordingly, both vˆ(δ) and v(δ) are continuous in δ.
3. STRATEGIC CHOICE OF CURING RATE
3.1 Equilibria without probability weighting
Let D ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , d¯} with d¯ <∞ be the set of degrees of
the network.We assume that each node is only aware of her
own degree, and the degree distribution P (·). Therefore,
all nodes with a given degree have the same information
about the network. This is more realistic assumption in
large-scale systems compared to assuming that all nodes
know the entire network topology (which is the case in
related prior work on epidemic games (Omic et al., 2009)).
We assume that all nodes with degree k choose a curing
rate δk ≥ 0 as a pure strategy, i.e., they behave as if being
controlled by a single entity. Accordingly, under the DBMF
approximation, all degree k nodes experience an identical
infection probability in the endemic state.
Let ck > 0 be the per-unit cost of curing rate for nodes
with degree k. In this subsection, to establish a baseline, we
consider nodes who minimize the infection probability in
the endemic state plus the cost of their selected curing rate,
i.e., they are true expectation minimizers. We will later
compare this to the outcome under nonlinear probability
weighting. The expected cost of nodes with degree k is
defined as
Jk(δk, δ−k) := xk(δk, δ−k) + ckδk, (8)
where xk(δk, δ−k) is the steady-state infection probability
of degree k nodes as defined in (3). Note that when δk = 0,
xk(0, δ−k) = 1, and Jk(0, δ−k) = 1. Consequently, it is
never optimal to choose δk >
1
ck
. Therefore, we define the
set of feasible curing rates δk as ∆k := [0,
1
ck
]. Furthermore,
we assume that the nodes prefer to choose δk = 0 instead
of 1
ck
when the optimal cost is 1.
We denote the game defined above by Γ(D, P, {ck}k∈D).
We now define the degree based equilibrium (DBE) of this
game in a manner analogous to the definition of a pure
Nash equilibrium (PNE) for strategic games.
Definition 1. The vector of curing rates δNE, with δNEk ∈
∆k, is a DBE if Jk(δ
NE
k , δ
NE
−k) ≤ Jk(δk, δ
NE
−k) for every
δk ∈ ∆k, k ∈ D. Note that all nodes of the same degree
choose the same curing rate in a DBE.
Remark 2. The above definition differs from the standard
notion of PNE, where each node can potentially choose a
different strategy (depending on the choices of the other
nodes). Nonetheless, the notion of DBE is mathematically
equivalent to a PNE in a game where a single player
chooses the curing rate of all nodes of the same degree
in order to minimize (8).
We now establish the convexity of xk(δk, δ−k) in δk under
the DBMF approximation.
Lemma 2. xk(δk, δ−k) is decreasing and convex in δk for
δk ∈ [0, δˆk(δ−k)).
Proof. Recall from Corollary 1 that for δk ∈ [0, δˆk(δ−k)),
v(δk, δ−k) is nonzero. We drop the argument (δk, δ−k) for
ease of readability, and differentiate the first equation in
(3) with respect to δk as
∂xk
∂δk
=
kv′k
δk + kv
−
kv(1 + kv′k)
(δk + kv)2
=
k(δkv
′
k − v)
(δk + kv)2
.
From Lemma 1, we have v′k < 0, and accordingly
∂xk
∂δk
< 0.
We now compute
∂2xk
∂δ2k
=
kδkv
′′
k
(δk + kv)2
−
2k(δkv
′
k − v)(1 + kv
′
k)
(δk + kv)3
.
Note that δkv
′
k − v < 0 from the above discussion. From
Lemma 1, we have v′′k > 0, and (1 + kv
′
k) > 0 (from (6) in
the proof of Lemma 1). Accordingly, ∂
2xk
∂δ2
k
> 0. 
With the above result, we now establish the existence of a
DBE of the game Γ(D, P, {ck}k∈D).
Proposition 1. Γ(D, P, {ck}k∈D) possesses a DBE.
Proof. Consider the set of nodes with degree k ∈ D.
The corresponding feasible strategy set ∆k is compact and
convex. Following Remark 1, xk(δ), and therefore Jk(δ), is
continuous in δ ∈
∏
i∈D∆i.
For a given δ−k, let δˆk(δ−k) be as defined in Corollary 1.
From Lemma 2, it follows that xk(δk, δ−k), defined as (3),
is nonzero, continuous, strictly decreasing and convex in
δk for δk ∈ [0, δˆk(δ−k)). If δˆk(δ−k) >
1
ck
, then xk(δk, δ−k)
is convex for δk ∈ ∆k.
On the other hand, suppose δˆk(δ−k) ≤
1
ck
. Then,
xk(δk, δ−k) is a continuous and convex function; it is
nonzero and convex for δk ∈ [0, δˆk(δ−k)) (Lemma 2), and
xk(δk, δ−k) = 0 for δk ≥ δˆk(δ−k) (Corollary 1). Moreover,
the derivative of xk(δk, δ−k) is nondecreasing for δk ∈ ∆k,
and therefore xk(δk, δ−k) is convex in δk. As a result, for
a given δ−k, Jk(δk, δ−k) is convex.
Recall from Remark 2 that DBE is equivalent to the PNE
of a strategic game where all nodes with a given degree are
controlled by a single player. From the above discussion,
this equivalent strategic game is an instance of a concave
game. Following (Rosen, 1965), there exists a PNE of the
equivalent game and consequently, a DBE exists. 
In the next result, we obtain several characteristics of the
curing rates at a DBE.
Proposition 2. Let δNE denote the curing rates at a DBE
of Γ(D, P, {ck}k∈D) with v
NE > 0. Then,
(1) If ci ≥
1
i
for every i ∈ D, then δNEi = 0 for every i ∈ D.
(2) If ci <
1
i
, then δNEi > 0.
(3) Let ci = c for every i ∈ D. If δ
NE
j = 0 for some j ∈ D,
then δNEk = 0 for all k ∈ D with k > j.
Proof. For the first part of the proof, let S be the
set of players with positive curing rates. Let Sc be the
complement of S. Note that when δj = 0, the expected
cost is Jj(0, δ−k) = 1. Accordingly, for k ∈ S, we have
ckδ
NE
k + x
NE
k ≤ 1 =⇒ ckδ
NE
k ≤ 1−
kvNE
δNEk + kv
NE
=⇒ ck ≤
1
δNEk + kv
NE
. (9)
On the other hand, from (4) we have
1 =
∑
k∈S
kqk
δNEk + kv
NE
+
∑
i∈Sc
qi
vNE
=⇒ 1−
∑
i∈Sc
qi
vNE
≥
∑
k∈S
ckkqk ≥
∑
k∈S
qk (10)
=⇒ 1−
∑
k∈S
qk ≥
1
vNE
∑
i∈Sc
qi =⇒ v
NE ≥ 1,
which is true only when S is an empty set. In (10), the
first inequality is a consequence of (9), and the second
inequality is a consequence of ck ≥
1
k
and k ≥ 1.
For the second part of the proof, we compute the derivative
of the cost function Jk(δk, δ−k) in (8) at δk = 0 as
∂Jk
∂δk
= ck +
∂xk
∂δk
∣∣∣∣
δk=0
= ck −
1
kv
< ck −
1
k
< 0.
Therefore, δk = 0 is not the optimal curing rate irrespec-
tive of δ−k. Finally, let δ
NE
j = 0 for a node with degree j.
Then,
∂Jj
∂δj
∣∣∣∣
δj=0
= c − 1
jvNE
≥ 0. Now, for any k > j, we
have c− 1
kvNE
> c− 1
jvNE
> 0. Thus, we have δNEk = 0. 
The second property and a weaker version of the first
property stated in the above proposition were also shown
in (Omic et al., 2009) under the NIMFA of the SIS
dynamics. Proposition 2 shows that these properties also
hold under the DBMF approximation.
The third part of the above result shows that when all
nodes have homogeneous per-unit curing costs, and the
equilibrium curing rate is 0 for certain degrees of nodes,
then these nodes must correspond to a set of high degree
nodes. Intuitively, for nodes with a large number
of neighbors, increasing their curing rates has
limited impact on counteracting the relatively high
probability of infection they are exposed to via
their neighbors.
3.2 Equilibria under probability weighting
In this subsection, we establish the existence of a DBE
when the nodes have nonlinear perception of infection
probabilities. As discussed in Section 2.1, we consider
probability weighting functions that satisfy Assumption 1.
Let the weighting function for the set of nodes with degree
k be wk(·). Let ck > 0 denote the per-unit cost of curing
rate as before. The perceived expected cost incurred by
this set of nodes is defined as
J
(w)
k (δk, δ−k) := wk(xk(δk, δ−k)) + ckδk. (11)
The set of feasible curing rates δk is ∆k := [0,
1
ck
]. We
denote the resulting game as Γ(D, P, {ck}k∈D, {wk}k∈D).
Recall from Assumption 1 that wk(x) is concave for
x ∈ [0,xmin,wk ] and is convex for x ∈ [xmin,wk , 1], where
xmin,wk := argminx∈[0,1]w
′
k(x). Therefore, the cost func-
tion in (11) is not necessarily convex for δk ≥ 0, unlike the
cost function for true expectation minimizers. In order to
establish the existence of a DBE under nonlinear proba-
bility weighting, we start with the following proposition.
Proposition 3. For a given z ∈ (0, 1), let ck = c0 >
1
(1−z)
for every k ∈ D. Then, for every δ ∈
∏
i∈D
[
0, 1
c0
]
and
k ∈ D, xk(δ) > z.
Proof. Let δ0 be the vector of curing rates with δi =
1
c0
,
∀i ∈ D. For δ ∈
∏
i∈D
[
0, 1
c0
]
, we have v(δ0) ≤ v(δ)
(Lemma 1), and thus, xk(δ0) ≤ xk(δ) (Lemma 2 and (3)).
Thus, it suffices to show that xk(δ0) > z. It is easy to see
that i
2
1+ic0z
is convex in i. By Jensen’s inequality,
∑
i∈D
i2P (i)
1 + ic0z
≥
〈d〉
2
1 + 〈d〉c0z
. (12)
Since c0 >
1
(1−z) and 〈d〉 > 1, we have
〈d〉 < c0(1− z)〈d〉
2
=⇒ 〈d〉+ 〈d〉
2
c0z < c0〈d〉
2
=⇒ 1 <
c0
〈d〉
〈d〉
2
1 + 〈d〉c0z
≤
c0
〈d〉
∑
i∈D
i2P (i)
1 + ic0z
(from (12))
=⇒ 1 <
∑
i∈D
c0iqi
1 + ic0z
.
Accordingly, we have v(δ0) > z where v(δ0) satisfies (4).
Furthermore,
c0v(δ0) > c0z >
z
1− z
=⇒ z <
c0v(δ0)
1 + c0v(δ0)
≤
c0kv(δ0)
1 + c0kv(δ0)
= xk(δ0),
for k ∈ D. This concludes the proof. 
We are now ready to prove the existence of a DBE.
Proposition 4. Let the set of nodes with degree k have
weighting function wk(·) satisfying Assumption 1. Let
xmin,wk = xmin, and ck = c0 >
1
1−xmin
for ev-
ery k ∈ D. Then there exists a DBE of the game
Γ(D, P, {ck}k∈D, {wk}k∈D).
Proof. From Assumption 1, we know that
wk(xk(δk, δ−k)) is convex in xk(δk, δ−k) for
xk(δk, δ−k) ∈ [xmin, 1]. Furthermore, from Lemma 2,
we know that xk(δk, δ−k) is convex in δk for a given
feasible curing rate vector δ−k. For δ ∈
∏
k∈D∆k,
xk(δ) > xmin following Proposition 3, and accordingly,
wk(xk(δk, δ−k)) is convex in δk for a given δ−k. From the
above discussion, and following the proof of Proposition
1, we observe that Γ is equivalent to a strategic game
where all nodes of a given degree are controlled by a single
player who minimizes a convex cost function. Following
(Rosen, 1965), a PNE exists in the equivalent game.
Consequently, Γ possesses a DBE. 
Remark 3. For Prelec weighting functions (i.e., when
wk(·), k ∈ D are given by (1)), xmin,wk =
1
e
is independent
of α. Thus, the above result holds when nodes of different
degrees with Prelec weighting functions are heterogeneous
vis-a-vis their weighting parameters.
At the DBE for true expectation minimizers, we showed
that the equilibrium curing rates are 0 when curing costs
are larger than 1 (Proposition 2). In contrast, the following
result shows that under nonlinear probability weighting,
the curing rates are strictly positive at the DBE (including
when the cost parameters are larger than 1).
Proposition 5. Let δNE be a DBE strategy profile. Then
δNEk > 0 irrespective of the curing rate cost ck.
Proof. We compute the derivative of the cost function
Jk(δk, δ−k) in (11) at δk = 0 as
∂Jk
∂δk
= ck + w
′(xk(δk, δ−k))
∂xk
∂δk
∣∣∣∣
δk=0
= ck − w
′(1)
1
kv
< 0,
since w′(1 − ǫ) → ∞ as ǫ → 0, following Assumption
1. Therefore, the expected perceived cost is decreasing at
δk = 0, and accordingly δ
NE
k > 0. 
Discussion: The above result shows that players with
nonlinear perception of probabilities always choose a
nonzero curing rate at equilibrium irrespective of the per-
unit cost of curing rate (as long as the cost is finite),
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
x
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
dw
(x)
/dx
Vd Xd
dc
Fig. 2. Roots of w′(x) = dc are denoted by Vd and Xd. In
this example w(·) is a Prelec weighting function with
parameter α = 0.4 and dc = 0.8.
in contrast with the equilibria under true expectation
minimizers. This is a consequence of underweighting of
large probabilities. When the true infection probability is
1, a small increase in curing rate leads to a large perceived
reduction in infection probability which leads to a nonzero
curing rate at the equilibrium.
We now illustrate how the nonzero curing rate varies with
the per-unit cost in the more tractable case of degree-
regular networks.
3.3 Comparison of curing rates in degree-regular graphs
A network is degree-regular when every node has an
identical degree d. Accordingly, in our framework, an
identical curing rate δ ≥ 0 is chosen for all nodes in the
network. Since the network is degree-regular, a randomly
chosen neighbor also has degree d. Therefore, v = xd. From
(4), we obtain
1 =
d
δ + dv
=⇒ v = 1−
δ
d
.
Therefore, the infection probability of a node in the
endemic state is
xd =


1−
δ
d
if δ ≤ d,
0 otherwise.
(13)
Note that for degree-regular graphs, the infection prob-
abilities at the endemic state under DBMF and NIMFA
coincide. We focus on the regime where the curing cost
c > 1
d
. Let w(·) (satisfying Assumption 1) be the proba-
bility weighting function of the decision-maker. We denote
the optimal curing rate for a true expectation minimizer,
and under nonlinear probability weighting by δN and δW,
respectively. As shown in (Hota and Sundaram, 2018b) for
weighting functions that satisfy Assumption 1, there are
at most two roots of the equation w′(x) = dc for x ∈ [0, 1]
denoted by Xd > xmin,w and Vd < xmin,w (as depicted
in Figure 2). Recall that xmin,w := argminx∈[0,1]w
′(x).
We obtain the following result on the optimal curing rates
denoted by δN and δW for true and nonlinear perception of
probabilities, respectively.
Proposition 6. Let c > 1
d
be the per-unit cost of curing
rate. Then, δN = 0, while δW = min{ 1
c
, d(1 −Xd)}.
Proof. For δ ≤ 1
c
< d, the expected cost of a true
expectation minimizer is J(δ) = 1− δ
d
+cδ, which is strictly
increasing in δ. Therefore, δN = 0.
On the other hand, the marginal cost under probability
weighting is given by J ′(w)(δ) = w′
(
1− δ
d
)
−1
d
+ c. For
δ ∈ [0, 1
c
], the true infection probability 1− δ
d
∈ [1− 1
dc
, 1].
If 1 − 1
dc
> Xd, then J
′(w)(δ) < 0 for every δ ∈ [0, 1
c
], and
therefore, δW = 1
c
.
Otherwise, if Vd < 1 −
1
dc
≤ Xd, δ = d(1 −Xd) ∈ [0,
1
c
] is
the only curing rate that satisfies the first order necessary
condition of optimality. Since Xd > xmin,w, we also have
w′′(Xd) > 0. Accordingly, δ
W = d(1−Xd), and the resulting
true infection probability is Xd.
Now suppose that 1− 1
dc
< Vd. In this case, both d(1−Xd)
and d(1 − Vd) satisfy the first order optimality condition.
First we show that J (w)(1
c
) ≤ J (w)(d(1 − Vd)).
2 Let
Zd := 1−
1
cd
. From (11), we obtain
J (w)
(
1
c
)
= w(Zd) + 1,
J (w)(d(1 − Vd)) = w(Vd) + cd(1 − Vd).
Accordingly,
J (w)
(
1
c
)
− J (w)(d(1− Vd))
=w(Zd)− w(Vd) + 1− cd(1 − Vd)
=w(Zd)− w(Vd)− cd(Zd − Vd)
=(Zd − Vd)
[
w(Zd)− w(Vd)
Z − Vd
− w′(Vd)
]
< 0,
where the inequality follows from the concavity of w(x) for
x ∈ [Zd, Vd]. On the other hand, 1 = J
(w)(0) < J (w)(1
c
) =
1 + w(1 − 1
cd
). Finally, J ′(w)(δ) ≤ 0 for δ ∈ [0, d(1 −Xd)]
with J ′(w)(d(1−Xd)) = 0 and J
′′(w)(d(1−Xd)) > 0. Thus,
J (w)(d(1 − Xd)) ≤ J
(w)(0). Therefore, δW = d(1 −Xd) in
this case as well. 
In other words, when the per-unit cost of curing satisfies
c > 1
d
, the optimal curing rate for a true expectation min-
imizer is 0, and consequently the infection probability is 1.
In contrast, a decision-maker with nonlinear perception of
probabilities chooses a nonzero curing rate which decreases
to 0 in a smooth manner as c increases. Even for a large
per-unit cost of curing rate, the infection probability is less
than 1 under nonlinear probability weighting.
4. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we initiated the study of strategic decision-
making by humans to protect against SIS epidemics on
networks. We considered a population game framework
where nodes choose curing rates to reduce the infection
probability in the endemic state of the SIS epidemic
under suitable mean-field approximations. We established
the existence of degree based equilibria in both settings
under risk neutral as well as behavioral decision-makers
whose perceptions of infection probabilities are governed
by prospect theory. Furthermore, we showed that players
2 The following arguments are analogous to the ones used in the
proof of Lemma 1 in our prior work (Hota and Sundaram, 2018b).
with nonlinear perception of infection probabilities always
choose a nonzero curing rate at the equilibrium, while
true expectation minimizers choose the curing rate to
be zero for sufficiently high cost per-unit cost of curing.
Characterizing the price of anarchy as well as the social
costs at the equilibria under true and nonlinear probability
weighting remain as important future directions.
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